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The Appellant/Defendant, through counsel, hereby, submits this appellate brief.
The list of all the parties is the same as the caption; therefore, no list of all the parties is
submitted.
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4

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant/Defendant appeals from a conviction for forgery, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (l)-(4). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Should this Court reverse the trial court's conclusion of law that the

Appellant/Defendant was guilty of all the elements of forgery when one element was
missing by the court's own declaration—that his purpose in committing the forgery was
to do the right thing, which purpose is contrary to forgery's element to defraud.
Standard of Review. This Court will review this issue under the correctness
standard for legal error committed by the trial court in its use of fixed principles and rules
of law, determining whether the trial court incorrectly selected, interpreted or applied the
law. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). It gives no deference to the trial
court's conclusions of law.
2.

Should

this

Court

reverse

the

trial

court's

finding

that

the

Appellant/Defendant lacked authority to use Mr. Scott Abbott's name when he had given
prior, written authorization to use his name in the way the Appellant/Defendant used it?
Standard of Review. This Court will review this issue under the clearly erroneous
standard to determine whether the marshaled evidence fails to support the findings while
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (clearly erroneous standard of review); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc.
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v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (marshaling requirement); Johnson v.
ffigley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
3.

Should

this

Court

reverse

the

trial

court's

finding

that

the

Appellant/Defendant lacked authority to correct deed of trust errors when Mr. Scott
Abbott provided him with the pre-signed and notarized deeds of trust for this very
purpose and did not finally revoke in writing the authority to use them until a year after
the alleged forgery of the partial deed of trust?
Standard of Review. This Court will review this issue under the clearly erroneous
standard to determine whether the marshaled evidence fails to support the findings while
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (clearly erroneous standard of review); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc.
v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (marshaling requirement); Johnson v.
ffigley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
According to the forgeiy law, found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(l)-(4):
(1) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information
including forms such as: (a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards,
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right,
privilege, or identification; (b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other
instrument or writing issued by a government or any agency; or (c) a check,
an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an
interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim
against any person or enterprise.
(2) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: (a)
5
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alters any writing of another without his authority or utters the altered
writing; or (b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making,
completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication,
or utterance: (i) purports to be the act of another, whether the person is
existent or nonexistent; (ii) purports to be an act on behalf of another party
with the authority of that other party; or (iii) purports to have been executed
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case,
or to be a copy of an original when an original did not exist.
(3) It is not a defense to a charge of forgery under Subsection (2)(b)(ii) if an
actor signs his own name to the writing if the actor does not have authority
to make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter
the writing on behalf of the party for whom the actor purports to act.
(4) Forgery is a third degree felony.

STATEMENT OF CASE
The State charged Appellant/Defendant by information with forgery, a third
degree felony. R001. At a bench trial, the judge found him guilty. R069.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On February 23, 2011, the district court held a bench trial in this criminal forgery
matter and found the Defendant guilty. R065-071.
2. When finding guilt, the trial court stated, "I think he was trying to do the right
thing," (Rl 10:223, lines 18-19) but found conclusively that what he did was "in
accordance with what the elements are of the charge." Rl 10:223, line 20-21.
3. In its minutes, the Court stated, "The court finds that Mr. Robbennolt had no
authority to use Mr. Abbott's signature when he did and therefore, finds the
defendant guilty of count 1." R069-071. Emphasis added.
6
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4. Testimony at the preliminary hearing and at trial from Mr. Abbott revealed that
he did not give the Appellant/Defendant explicit, verbal authority to use his
signature on the partial deed of trust delivered to Mr. Mangum. R109:13, lines
21-22, R109:16, lines 10-11, Rl 10.
5. Evidence admitted at trial showed written authority from Mr. Abbott for the
Appellant/Defendant to act in his behalf for the company in managing the day-today company projects. R i l l : "Keystone Restructuring Agreement-A," Ex. 1, p.
5, §5.1.
6. This management also included "balanced risk management." R i l l : KRAA, Ex.
1, p. 5, §5.1.
7. The management included the highest duty: "to lead, operate, and manage
Keystone to the best interest of Keystone." R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.1.
8. Managing the operations of Keystone involved executing and delivering "all
documents" that "may be reasonably necessary to effectuate the provisions of this
Agreement-A." R i l l : "Stocks Purchase Agreement-B" (SPAB), Ex. 2, pp.5-6,
§2 ("Agreement-A to Perform Necessary Acts").
9. One of the day-to-day company projects that the Appellant/Defendant was
managing involved the master deed of trust on the Townsend, Montana property.
R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 2, pp.3-4, §2 ("Existing Keystone Projects").
10. The Townsend, Montana property master deed of trust was a Keystone asset, not
an Abbott-owned asset, although it was titled in Mr. Abbott's name.
KRAA, Ex. 1, pp.3-4, §2 ("Existing Keystone Projects").
7
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Rill:

11. Mr. Mangum, the victim of the alleged forgery, entered into an investment
contract which mandated that his investment "shall" be secured by a partial deed
of trust. Rl 11: "JR Partnership Agreement," Ex.3, p.4, §5("Security").
12. The partial deed of trust was to the master deed of trust on the Townsend,
Montana property. R109:4, lines 12-13, R i l l : Ex. A, p.l.
13. The Appellant/Defendant and Mr. Mangum understood that Mr. Mangum was
owed a partial deed of trust. R109:4-5, R109:6, line 4.
14. As security for Mr. Mangum's investment, the partial deed of trust was not
delivered to him. R109:4, lines 18-19.
15. When Mr. Mangum told the Appellant/Defendant

of the error, the

Appellant/Defendant sought to correct the deficiency by delivering a partial deed
of trust to Mr. Mangum on the Keystone asset—the master deed of trust on the
Townsend, Montana property. R109:5, lines 3-21.
16. Mr. Mangum believed that he immediately recognized the partial deed of trust as
a forgery because the date on the deed preceded his request and it had Mr.
Abbott's name on it. R109:5, lines 15-25,
17. Mr. Mangum spoke to Mr. Abbott about whether he signed the particular, partial
deed of trust he had been given. R109:6, lines 17-25, R109:7, lines 1-3.
18. Mr. Abbott denied signing the notarized, partial deed of trust that the
Appellant/Defendant had delivered to Mr. Mangum.

R109:6, lines 17-25,

R109:7, lines 1-3, R109:22-23.
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19. The notarized, partial deed of trust, however, came from the blank, pre-signed,
and already notarized deeds of trust that Mr. Abbott had given in 2007 to the
Appellant/Defendant to use at the outset of managing Keystone to correct deed of
trust errors. R109:16, lines 19-24, R109:18, lines 3-4, R109:20, lines 7-8, 20-21.
20. Although the two had significant disagreements about the management of
Keystone and other personal problems before 2009 (R109:13, lines 3-6), Mr.
Abbott never withdrew the authority in writing he had given to the
Appellant/Defendant to use the notarized deeds of trust until 2010. Rl 11: "Due
Diligence & Evidence Agreement," Ex. 15, p.2, #6, Rl 10.
21. The alleged forgery using the pre-signed and notarized deed previously given to
him occurred in 2009. R109:5, lines 9-12, R109:21, lines 16-18.
22. The trial court judge found that the Appellant/Defendant was trying to do the
right thing by delivering the partial deed of trust to Mr. Mangum.

R067-

069:"SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT"; Rl 10:223, lines 18-19
"TRANSCRIPT for hearing 2-23-2011."

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As a matter of law, the forgery conviction must be reversed for legal error because
the element of intent to defraud was not found.

The trial court, in fact, found the

opposite. It found the Appellant/Defendant was trying to do the right thing, which is
completely counter to the intent to trick, deceive, or defraud anyone.
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From an evidentiary perspective, the trial court was clearly erroneous in its finding
of no authority to sign.

Substantial reasons existed to doubt the lack of authority.

Although Mr. Scott Abbott verbally claimed at trial that he did not give specific
authorization for the Appellant/Defendant to use his signature for the partial deed of trust
and that the two had major disagreements about Keystone before 2009, the written
evidence shows he contractually gave the Appellant/Defendant that authority by 2008, if
not in 2007. The authority to use Mr. Scott Abbott's name in behalf of their jointbusiness lasted until it was contractually signed away in its entirety in 2010, covering the
2009 time period in which the alleged forgery occurred.
The written evidence also shows that by giving the Appellant/Defendant presigned deeds of trust in 2007, Mr. Scott Abbott empowered the Appellant/Defendant to
correct any deed of trust errors.

Correcting such errors was consistent with the

contractual authority Mr. Abbott gave him to do, which authority to use the pre-signed
deeds of trust lasted until 2010 when it was contractually disaffirmed in writing and
signed by Mr. Abbott.
From 2007 to 2010, therefore, the Appellant/Defendant had (1) written
authorization during the time of the alleged forgery to use Mr. Abbott's signature for the
day-to-day operations of their joint company and he had (2) the intention to do what was
right in using Mr. Abbott's name. On the basis of written authority and the basis of
proper intent, the conviction for forgery must be set aside.

10
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ARGUMENT
I.
THERE CAN BE NO CONVICTION FOR FORGERY BECAUSE THE
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT FIND ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS:
INTENT TO DEFRAUD
According to Utah's statute on forgery, a "person is guilty of forgery i f he does
so "with purpose to defraud anyone." U.C.A. § 76-6-50l(l)-(4). The Utah Supreme
Court stated specifically that "[sjigning another's name may be no crime, but doing so
with intent to defraud makes the act forgery. In these and numerous other crimes a
particular purpose, motive of intent[,] is a necessary element within the meaning of the
statute." State v. Turner, 282 P. 2d 1045 (Utah 1955) (citations and quotations omitted);
see also State v. Winward, 909 P. 2d 909, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("To commit
forgery, one must possess the specific intent to defraud 'anyone' [or have knowledge that
he is facilitating a fraud] Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995). See State v. Turner, 3 Utah
2d 285, 288, 282 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1955) (Crockett, J., concurring)."). The intent, which
is a necessary element of forgery, must be nothing short of the intent to defraud.
The State's Exhibit A is a "Partial Assignment of Deed of Trust," purportedly
from Mr. Scott Abbott to Mr. William Brent Mangum. R i l l : State's Ex. A, p.l. The
subject

property

is

in

a

master

deed

of

trust

on

property

located

in

"Townsend,...Montana." IdL The Appellant/Defendant was found guilty of forging this
document.

R069-071: "SENTENCE, JUDGMENT,

COMMITMENT";

"TRANSCRIPT for hearing 2-23-2011."
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R110:

In contradiction to its conclusionary statement that "he was trying to defraud in
accordance with what the elements are of the charge" (R069-071: "SENTENCE,
JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT"; Rl 10:223, lines 20-21, the district court failed to find
any facts of fraud in its judgment for forgery. For example, it did not find any facts from
which an inference of fraud could be made—no facts that the Appellant/Defendant would
benefit from the transaction at the cost of someone else, no facts showing any reason the
Appellant/Defendant may have had to defraud the alleged victim, Mr. Mangum, and,
outside of their litigious relationship, the court found no facts showing how this
transaction would be fraudulent or detrimental in any way to Mr. Abbott. The trial court
simply found "no authority to sign." Id In fact, it stated, "And, again, it seems to me
that Mr. Robbennolt was trying to do what he could to make things right... .1 think he was
trying to do the right thing." Rl 10:223, lines 12-14, 18-19. Emphasis added. The trial
court found that the Appellant/Defendant's intention was the opposite of one to defraud;
it found that his intent or purpose was to do the right thing. This kind of intent or purpose
could not be more contrary to the intent to defraud.
After an analysis of the facts, the trial court came to a summation. The sequence
of concepts in the summation is significant. First, it spoke about (1) the lack of authority
and then second, it spoke of (2) the intent involved, which are the two major elements of
forgery. It explained as follows in the sequence of concepts or elements: "Why didn't the
Defendnat Mr. Robbennolt sign his own name? Because he couldn't. He needed Mr.
Abbott's signature. [1] That authority was not given. [2] And again it seems to me that

12
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Mr. Robbennolt was trying to do what he could to make things right....I think he was
trying to do the right thing." Rl 10:223, lines 12-14, 18-19. Numbers added. The
concepts expressed in sequence here show that the Appellant/Defendant had no authority
to sign, but that he was trying to do the right thing in what he did.
A reading of the entire judgment reveals that having "no authority to sign"
(Rl 10:222, lines 9-10) was the only element the court actually analyzed in its
determination as to whether the Appellant/Defendant committed forgery. See Rl 10:223,
lines 1-8; Rl 10:223, lines 9-12; Rl 10:223, lines 19-20.
In marshaling the evidence, the Appellant/Defendant notes that the trial court
began to analyze the facts for fraud. It stated, "The question is did he do that to defraud?
Was his purpose to defraud? And so I've set forth some things here that I want to
mention." Rl 10:221, lines 13-15. Then, instead of directing its findings to the facts that
show the Defendant's intent, it focused on the witnesses: "Credibility of the witnesses is
always at issue in these types of cases....It's clear to me that all parties were credible in,
in what they were trying to relate to the Court."

Rl 10:221, lines 16-17, 21-23.

Witnesses, however, cannot speculate as to the intent of a defendant's mind; therefore,
this focus on the credibility of witnesses does nothing to explore the question of whether
the Defendant had in his mind to defraud anyone.
Next, the court went on to discuss what it believed was the underlying subject:
"money, money, money is what we're dealing with here. That's the ultimate cause of
what's going on."

As stated, this acknowledgment about money does nothing to
13
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enlighten us on the Appellant/Defendant's intentions. If evidence had suggested that the
Appellant/Defendant would have gained money through this alleged forgery, then that
could have helped, but the facts never established how the Appellant/Defendant would
have profited or that he did profit from the alleged forgery here. There was no evidence.
The initial investment money for the partial deed of trust did not pass through his hands.
R109:7-8, lines 21-25, 1-2. The court's general reference to money, without any specific
application, is simply a complaint that if there had been no money to purchase anything,
then this problem would never have happened.
The court next stated, "Trust, trust, trust."

This general reference to trust,

however, was not applied to any specific person or set of facts. Other than the accusation
of forgery, there were no facts or evidence suggesting the Appellant/Defendant had
broken any specific trust. Immediately following this mention of trust, though, the court
held, "the Court does find that Mr. Robbennolt had no authority to sign on Mr. Abbott's
behalf." Simply having no authority to use another's signature is insufficient for forgery
because:
[T]he law does not conclusively presume that because a person signed the
name of another a forgery has occurred. The act of signing another's name
without permission does not constitute forgery unless it was done with the
intent to defraud [or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud].
Accordingly, to sustain a conviction for forgery, there must be a sufficient
connection between the act of forgery and the intent to defraud. In
establishing the nexus between the intent and the act, the law can presume
the intention so far as realized in the act, but not an intention beyond what
was so realized. Moreover, even if a defendant possesses both an intent to
defraud and commits the act of signing another's name without authority, a
forgery conviction cannot be sustained unless the act was done in
furtherance of the intention [or with knowledge that he is facilitating a
14
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fraud]. Stated another way, a defendant who has signed another's name
without permission, while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely
unrelated to the unauthorized endorsement, has not committed forgery.
State v. Winward. 909 P. 2d 909, 912-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Citations
and quotations omitted. Emphasis added.
In its analysis of the facts, the Court did not cite to any facts that would establish that the
Defendant was intending to defraud; it only cited facts showing that he did not have
permission to use another's name and that this was tantamount to fraud, meeting all the
elements

of

the

crime

charged.

R069-071:

"SENTENCE,

JUDGMENT,

COMMITMENT"; Rl 10:223, lines 19-21, "TRANSCRIPT for hearing 2-23-2011."
This, though, is legal error.
As the law above states, the act of signing Mr. Abbott's name, by itself, does not
constitute forgery, yet that is exactly what the Court found in both its unofficial minutes
and official judgment: "The court finds that Mr. Robbennolt had no authority to use Mr.
Abbott's signature when he did and therefore, finds the defendant guilty of count 1."
R069-071; see also Rl 10:223, lines 12-14, 18-19. ("I think he was trying to do the right
thing. But it doesn't detract from the fact that no authority to sign and he was trying to
defraud in accordance with what the elements are of the charge. Therefore, based upon
that, the court does judge Mr. Robbennolt guilty of the crime of Forgery, a Third Degree
Felony."). Even assuming the Appellant/Defendant had no authority to sign, this finding
of "trying to do the right thing" (Id.) is clearly inconsistent with a finding of guilt and the
intent to defraud. Accordingly, as a matter of law, the conviction for forgery and the
finding of guilt must be reversed and set aside.
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I I .

DURING THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED FORGERY, MR. SCOTT ABBOTT
HAD GIVEN WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION FOR THE
APPELLANT/DEFENDANT TO USE HIS NAME FOR THE PURPOSE FOR
WHICH HE USED IT
As stated above, the trial court found an intent to do right, not one to defraud. The
trial court also found that the Appellant/Defendant had no authority to sign. This finding,
however, is contradicted by substantial evidence presented at trial.
As a part of marshaling the evidence, the Appellant/Defendant notes that the trial
court mentioned a number of facts why the Appellant/Defendant did not have authority to
sign for Mr. Abbott on the property in question. It began with "the fact that Mr. Abbott's
signature was needed because the property was in his name." Rl 10:222, lines 11-13.
The court continued about Mr. Abbott, "He had to sign." Id at line 13. Then, discussing
the Appellant/Defendant, the trial court explained that even though he was part of
Keystone, "because of his history or background... [a] t least in this transaction, he wasn't
a signer. It was all in Mr. Abbott's name." Id at lines 14-16. Rhetorically, the trial
court then asked the next logical question, "Was there any contact made with Mr. Abbott
regarding the transaction by Mr. Robbennolt? Not that I could see. He did this on his
own" (R110:223, lines 1-3) without "at least ask[ing]...something" (Id at lines 6-7) of
Mr. Abbott about whether he could use his signature in this transaction.
Even though the trial court found that the Appellant/Defendant did not have the
authority to sign Mr. Scott Abbott's name, the written documentation conclusively shows
that his authority to use Mr. Abbott's name lasted from at least 2008 to 2010, during the
2009 alleged forgery.
16
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In 2008, the Appellant/Defendant and Mr. Scott Abbott acknowledged in writing
that they were both "cofounders" and "equal...owners" of "Keystone," a Delaware
corporation formed back in "2006." See R i l l : "Keystone Restructure Agreement-A"
(KRAA), Ex. 1, p.l. The two parties made reference to the "Townsend, Montana"
property that was an "existing Company project[] with contracts, options, or title
ownership." Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, pp.3-4, §2 ("Existing Keystone Projects"). Giving the
Appellant/Defendant broad authority to act in Keystone's and its investors' best interests
while managing risk, Mr. Abbott executed the document that states "Robbennolt will
continue to lead, operate, and manage Keystone to the best interest of Keystone,... and its
investors...with balanced risk management." R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.1. Emphasis
added. The Appellant/Defendant's role was active and significant: to lead, to operate, to
manage, and to do so in the best interest of Keystone, and to balance risks.
By written contract, Mr. Abbott willfully took on a passive role in dealing with
Keystone and the Townsend, Montana property because the "Keystone Restructure
Agreement-A" gave him no duties to lead, or operate, or manage any of Keystone's
business, properties, or projects.

See R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 1.

No other subsequent

document changed his lack of responsibilities to operate Keystone, either.

The

Appellant/Defendant was the only one who had the contractual right and obligation to
handle business related to the property at issue—the Townsend, Montana property.
Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.1 And he did just that by issuing a partial deed of trust to
Mr. Mangum in the master deed of trust that Keystone had on the Townsend, Montana
property.
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The alleged forgery in regards to the Townsend, Montana property occurred on or
about January 9, 2009 (R001: "Information"), during the period when the
Appellant/Defendant had written authority to operate Keystone in Mr. Abbott's behalf,
who had the passive role. See Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, p.l (signed in 2008, acknowledging
co-ownership of Keystone along with Appellant/Defendant managing Keystone) and
R i l l : "Due Diligence & Evidence Agreement," Ex. 15, p.2, #6 (signed in 2010,
acknowledging that Appellant/Defendant no longer could use the pre-signed and
notarized deeds of trust given by Mr. Abbott to Appellant/Defendant in 2007).
The Appellant/Defendant used Mr. Abbott's name in the partial deed of trust
consistent with the contractual authority he had been given for the following reasons:
First, he was to "manage" the day-to-day operations of Keystone, of which Mr.
Abbott's name was part.

See R i l l : KRAA, Ex. 1, p.l and p. 5, §5.1. Thus, the

Appellant/Defendant was to act in Mr. Abbott's behalf on a daily basis through Keystone.
He used his name regularly in this way. The two acted under each other's names as a
part of their business—it was their accepted business practice. See Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1,
p.l, "Recitals" ("Abbott has been keeping and/or holding Robbennolt's Stocks and/or
400 shares under his name." Emphasis added.); R109:30, lines9-12 ("normal course").
Second, the Appellant/Defendant was to act in Keystone's "best interest." R i l l :
KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.1. It was in Keystone's best interest to correct a partial deed of
trust error, which deed was rightfully owed on its Townsend, Montana property.
Consistent

with

his

obligations

to

act

in

Keystone's

best

interests,

the

Appellant/Defendant delivered a partial deed of trust to correct the error Mr. Mangum
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suffered when the partial deed of trust on that property was not delivered to him as
contractually required. See R i l l : "JR Partnership Agreement," Ex.3, p.4, §5("Security")
("This investment shall be secured by a deed of trust against a property.... A separate and
different Promissory Note and Deed of Trust shall be issued for this investment.").
Emphasis added. Performing the correcting of a partial deed of trust was explicitly
permitted by Mr. Abbott. R027: "PRELIMINARY HEARING," R i l l , R109:16, lines
19-24, R109:18, lines 3-4.
Third, the Appellant/Defendant not only acted in the best interests of Keystone,
but also acted to manage "risk," as was his duty. See Rl 11: KRAA, Ex. 1, p.l and p. 5,
§5.1. It was a risk to Keystone's assets, particularly the Townsend, Montana asset that
was titled in Mr. Abbott's name (Rill: KRAA, Ex. 1, pp.3-4, §2 ["Existing Keystone
Projects"]) if a security for monetary interest that Mr. Mangum had already paid was not
provided to him.

The risk was a lawsuit against the asset holder: Keystone.

By

supplying Mr. Mangum with the partial deed of trust on the Keystone asset that was due
him, the Appellant/Defendant sought to minimize "risk" (IdL) and perform the contractual
obligations owed to Mr. Mangum.
Fourth, because the Townsend, Montana asset was a company asset (Rill:
KRAA, Ex. 1, pp.3-4, §2 ["Existing Keystone Projects"]), not a Mr. Abbott asset, and
because the Appellant/Defendant was the only one to manage the company assets
according to the authority Mr. Abbott gave him in the "Keystone Restructure AgreementA," the Appellant/Defendant did nothing illegal or improper in delivering the partial deed
of trust on that asset. The partial deed of trust had to have Mr. Abbott's name on it
19
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because it was titled in his name, not Keystone's or Mr. Robbennolt's, as the trial court
noted. Rl 10:222, lines 11-13 ("Mr. Abbott's signature was needed because the property
was in his name.").

Thus, Mr. Abbott had already given the Appellant/Defendant

authority to use that Townsend, Montana asset with his name titled on it. There was no
written prohibition from doing so. There was no requirement for any further discussion
with Mr. Abbott on how the Appellant/Defendant

would use it.

The

Appellant/Defendant was to use it in whatever way he thought was in the best interest of
the company. This authority was not taken away in writing until 2010 in the final "Due
Diligence & Evidence Agreement." See R i l l : Ex. 15, p. 1.
The State may cite to the "Conflict of Interest" provision for required
consultations in the "Keystone Restructuring Agreement-A," but it is inapplicable
because no anticipated conflict of interest had arisen at that time. The only conflict
anticipated was one where the Appellant/Defendant may want "to enter into a real estate
development relationship with a MCI Development or Keystone Contact."

Rill:

KRAA, Ex. 1, p. 5, §5.2. If so, then the requirement to "consult with Abbott and seek his
approval" (Id.) would apply. Because it did not apply, the Appellant/Defendant did not
have to seek any further approval from Mr. Abbott to use his name on the company asset
for Mr. Mangum's partial deed of trust transaction. That transaction was not a "MCI
Development or Keystone Contact" transaction; thus, no approval was necessary.
If Mr. Abbott thought his approval for the Keystone day-to-day activities was
necessary, then he would have reserved it in the contract like he did for the Conflict of
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Interest provision.

But, he did not.

Appellant/Defendant:

In fact, he executed the opposite for the

i

In the counterpart to the first "Keystone Restructuring Agreement-A," Mr. Abbott
gave the Appellant/Defendant the following right and mandate: the Appellant/Defendant
"shall execute and deliver all documents.. .that may be reasonably necessary to effectuate
the provisions of this Agreement-A." Rlll:"Stocks Purchase Agreement-B" (SPAB),
Ex. 2, pp.5-6, §11 ("Agreement-A to Perform Necessary Acts"). Emphasis added. This
is precisely what the Appellant/Defendant did when he delivered the partial deed of trust
document to Mr. Mangum.
The Appellant/Defendant saw that it was "reasonably necessary to effectuate" the
operations of Keystone, as outlined in the Keystone Restructing Agreement-A. He then
acted accordingly. Mr. Abbott did not revoke in writing his written, explicit, broad, and
sweeping authority to deliver necessary documents at any time before the
Appellant/Defendant delivered the necessary partial deed of trust to Mr. Mangum. At
most, the two had had significant business disagreements prior to the deed delivery, but
not enough to revoke in writing any of the authority given. R109:13, lines 3-6. The
Appellant/Defendant did nothing to overstep his written authority in acting on behalf of
Mr. Abbott through Keystone. Accordingly, the factual finding of the trial court that he
did is clearly erroneous and must be reversed.
III.
CONSISTENT WITH THE WRITTEN AUTHORITY, MR. SCOTT ABBOTT
EMPOWERED THE APPELLANT/DEFENDANT TO CORRECT DEED OF
TRUST ERRORS WITH THE PRE-SIGNED AND NOTARIZED DEEDS OF
TRUST HE GAVE HIM
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According

to

Mr.

Scott

Abbott

at

the

preliminary

hearing

(R027:

"PRELIMINARY HEARING"; R109: "TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 04-26-2010"), he
gave the Appellant/Defendant the authority to correct deed of trust errors. R109:16, lines
19-24, R109:18, lines 3-4, R109:20, lines 7-8, 20-21, R109:21, lines 10-13. Then,
consistent with that authority, Mr. Abbott gave the Appellant/Defendant the ability to do
exactly that by the seven or so pre-signed and notarized deeds of trust, as referenced in
Exhibit 15, "Due Diligence & Evidence Agreement" (DDEA) of February 10, 2010. See
R i l l ("Envelope of Exhibits"). In that document, it states that the Appellant/Defendant
affirms that "all known notarized documents signed by Abbott and given to Robbennolt
in the fall of 2007 have been destroyed." Rl 11: DDEA, Ex. 15, p.l, #3. Attesting to the
truth of the statements within, Mr. Abbott executed the DDEA document on February 11,
2010 at 3:01 p.m. See R i l l : DDEA, Ex. 15,p.2,#6.
With the ability to correct deed of trust errors, the Appellant/Defendant delivered a
partial deed of trust on Mr. Abbott's and the Appellant/Defendant's business-owned
master deed of trust for property in Townsend, Montana to Mr. Brent Mangum because
he had not been given a partial deed of trust as required under his contract. Rl09:4-5,
R i l l : "JR Partnership Agreement," Ex.3, p.4, §5("Security") ("This investment shall be
secured by a deed of trust against a property.... A separate and different Promissory Note
and Deed of Trust shall be issued for this investment." Emphasis added). Mr. Mangum's
contract was with Mr. Hassan Kassir, who, at the time, represented American Star
Lending, and who, before 2010, had gained rights to "ownership/control" of the "master
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deed of trust in Townsend, Montana." See Rl 11: "Relinquishment Agreement," Ex. 13,
p.l, "Recitals." It was from this master deed of trust that Mr. Mangum was to receive his
partial deed of trust. Mr. Kassir was to deliver it. He failed to do so. R109:4-5.
Because Mr. Kassir failed to deliver the partial deed of trust, he later committed to
do the following: "Relinquish control and rights to Kassir's ownership/control of
the...master deed of trust in Townsend, Montana to Douglas Scott Abbott." See R i l l :
"Relinquishment Agreement," Ex. 13, p.l, "Recitals." In this way, Mr. Abbott regained
control on how the interests in the master deed of trust would be divided, which were
owned initially by Mr. Kassir before this final agreement. With this ability to control the
interests, "Douglas Scott Abbott has agreed to give Mangum rights to a fractional portion
of the [Townsend, Montana] deed of trust." See R i l l : "Relinquishment Agreement,"
Ex. 13, p.l, "Recitals."

Thus, Mr. Abbott effected the same resolution that the

Appellant/Defendant had attempted to do months earlier—making it possible for Mr.
Mangum to secure his interests in the master deed of trust to the Townsend, Montana
property.

Apparently now satisfied, Mr. Mangum agreed to "irrevocably and

unconditionally release Kassir, and any of his...representatives (except Kelly
Robbennolt)...from any and all actions." R i l l : "Settlement and Release Agreement,"
Ex. 14, p.2, §5.

The multiple transactions occurring here show that what the

Appellant/Defendant did was no different in any material way than what Mr. Abbott later
did for Mr. Mangum. The two both used legal instruments to give Mr. Mangum rights to
the Townsend, Montana property.

The parallel acts demonstrate that the

Appellant/Defendant did nothing fraudulent with the partial deed of trust because what it
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would have accomplished was the very same thing that Mr. Abbott accomplished later.
And he did so using the legal instruments Mr. Abbott had provided him at the outset to
correct the very problem he sought to solve by delivering the deed: correcting deed of
trust errors.

CONCLUSION
The trial court made a legal error when finding the Appellant/Defendant guilty of
forgery because instead of finding the element of intent to defraud, it found the intent of
"trying to do the right thing." The trial court was clearly erroneous in its factual finding
that the Appellant/Defendant lacked the authority to use Mr. Abbott's name in the presigned, notarized deeds of trust because written, contractual authority had already been
given him to do so. This authority is clearly shown in a number of documents signed
before the incident. The explicit, written authority was not finally revoked in writing
until a year after the Appellant/Defendant delivered the alleged forgery. Delivering the
partial deed of trust to Mr. Mangum with Mr. Abbott's signature on it was fully
consistent with the Appellant/Defendant's contractual duties, obligations, and rights—he
did so as a part of his obligations to "manage" the day-to-day projects of Keystone, of
which the Townsend, Montana property rights were a part; he did so out of his duty to act
in the "best interest" of Keystone in managing the Townsend, Montana property rights;
he did so to avoid the risk of lawsuits, which "risk management" was part of his
contractual job description; and he did so consistent with the pre-signed, notarized deeds
of trust that Mr. Abbott had given him to correct deed of trust errors, which Mr.
Mangum's partial deed of trust deficiency was certainly an error to correct. As a result,
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there was no forgery, legally or factually, and the trial court's judgment of forgery must,
therefore, be reversed.

V2^
DATED t h i s ^ day of September 2011.

Taylor C. Hartley
Attorney at Law
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed or delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to the following this Vfr day of September 2011.
Criminal Appeals Division
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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to Mr. Mangum, had no legal authority, according to
Counsel, to transfer anything out of Keystone.
Their argument is that he transferred
everything into Keystone. So why didn't - if that
document was transferring an interest to Mr. Mangum,
why does it have Scott Abbott's name on there? That's
a fraud right there. He has no authority to pass
anything because, according to Counsel, he's already
given all of his interest to Keystone. And so that
document that was given to Mr. Mangum should have said
either that it was signed by Mr. Robbennolt as himself
or as representing Keystone Venture Group. They were
the only people then that had any authority to
transfer any of that to Mr. Mangum.
Now, Counsel talked about: Where's the
fraud?
Okay, here's the fraud. The fraud is,
first of all, that that document purported to be the
act of Scott Abbott and it was not. He testified
clearly to you, he'd never authorized his signature to
be on that document. He would not have done that.
The document was prepared after the bad blood was
between them. Even by the dates that they have, it
was transferred when there wasn't — there wasn't any
business dealings between Mr. Abbott and, again, he
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Mr. Mangum off his back; he could try to, you know,
put things down the road. Basically, what he does is
smoke and mirrors. And that's what he has done today.
Same thing, he has document after document that he's
used to try to deceive these people, and, you know,
gave Mr. Mangum this, and then continued to try to
negotiate with him so he could figure out some way to
appease him without actually giving the money back,
and by transferring things to him in which there was
no interest. T h a f s exactly what he's done today:
Just given you document after document that is just
smoke and mirrors, Judge, and we would ask the Court
to find him guilty of the forgery.
T H E COURT: All right Thank you. Amber,
let's make sure that the exhibits get back to me.
Let me first say, thank you, Counsel.
Respect is a big part of what we do here in the court
system. I see that being shown today. Not only for
each other but to the Court as well as to the
witnesses who testified and all others that were
involved and you should be commended for that.
My plan is to review these documents,
these exhibits that have been presented, go over my
notes and come back with a verdict today. I don't
think that it will take me, hopefully, as long as a
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had no authority to make any transfer at that time.
And that's — that's exactly the way the
Defendant set this up, because then if Mr. Mangum came
back and sued somebody, he could say: "You can't sue
Keystone. This is signed by Mr. Abbott." And so his
only recourse would have been against Mr. Abbott, who
had no interest and no ability to sign any documents
or transfer them.
Now, Mr. Mangum gave the Defendant
approximately $175,000. He was to get — there were a
couple of things he was to get in return. He was
supposed to get payments, monthly payments, and also
an interest in that property. He did not get those
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jury would. But I think that I have taken enough
notes and I know what I need to look at and what I
want to look at, in my mind. So, if you wouldn't mind
waiting around. And if I think it's going to take
longer, I'll have Amber just get your cellphone
numbers and then I'll get back with you before too
long. But I'd like to take care of this today. And
that way we can move forward with this.
""
So, we'll be in recess.
(Recess.)
T H E COURT: Thank you, please be seated.
Okay. We are back on the record in the
matter of State of Utah versus Kelly James Robbennolt,
Case 091401782
All parties are present, including the
Defendant, Mr. Robbennolt.
This is a criminal action involving the
charge the Forgery, a Third Degree Felony being
alleged against Mr. Robbennolt.
After having heard the evidence and
testimony of three witnesses, Mr. Abbott, Mr. Mangum,
as well as Mr. Nixon, that's all the witness testimony
that I received along with the exhibits that I have
had'a chance to overlook. And there were some other
additional information provided by Mr. Hartley
220

The document that was given to him gave
him absolutely nothing because it had Scott Abbott's
name on it, because it was never recorded and because
there wasn't — there was no equity in the property to
be given to him. And so the document was completely
fraudulent.
It was supposed to be giving him a secured
interest, which it did not do. It did not give him
anything.
judge, I think clearly the Defendant
structured this so that he could try to keep
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regarding Kind or the setup or the reasoning
background for what happened here.
And the proof in criminal cases is beyond
a reasonable doubt

5
6
7

The State has that burden and in this case
for the charge of Forgery, it's pretty clear as to the
first few elements: It's no question that

8 Mr. Robbennolt, on or about January 9th, 2009, Utah
9 County, did submit a document to Mr. Mangum,
10 purporting to transfer an interest in some property in
11
!2
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4
5
6
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Montana. That was signed by Mr. Abbott. That's been
acknowledged. There's no dispute as to that.
The question is: Did he do that to
defraud? Was his purpose to defraud? And so I've set
forth some things here that I want to mention.
Credibility of the witnesses is always at
issue in these types of cases. No question that's
what it usually comes down to. And we had three
witnesses today, and in my mind in watching and
listening, in trying to establish what their thinking
might have been, it's dear to me that all parties

2 were credible in what they were trying to relate to
3 the Court.
I
And so I would commend them for that. Not
5 always do we get witnesses up that tell the truth, but
221
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Was there any contact made with Mr. Abbott
regarding the transaction by Mr. Robbennolt? Not that
I could see. He did this on his own. Normally in
business relationships, I would think, especially when
that interest is gone, that authority would still be
out of respect and trust, at least asked of, mentioned
to, something. But I don't see that that was the case
here as well.
And I put down here as well: Why didn't
the Defendant, Mr. Robbennolt, sign his own name?
Because he couldn't. He needed Mr. Abbott's
signature; that authority wasn't given. And, again,
it seems to me that Mr. Robbennolt was trying to do
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what he could to make things right. I think you get
yourself involved in these kind of things and you do
things to try and make it right and then you hope that
later you can fix the situation. This is a lot of
money involved. And I think he was trying to do the
right thing, but it doesn't detract from fact that no
authority to sign and he was trying to defraud in
accordance with what the elements are of the charge.
Therefore, based upon that, the Court does
judge Mr. Robbennolt guilty of the crime of Forgery, a
Third Degree Felony. And therefore, at this point, we
just need to set a time for sentencing.
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with here. That's the ultimate cause of what's going
6
on. And then I put down here: Trust, trust, trust.
7
That's what I was getting from the testimony and what
8
was being relayed.
9
No question the Court does find that
10
Mr. Robbennoft had no authority to sign on
11
Mr. Abbott's behalf. This is relayed by the fact that
Mr. Abbott's signature was needed because the property 12
13
was in his name. He had to sign even though
14
Mr. Robbennolt was part of Keystone because of his
15
history or background. At feast \n this transaction,
16
he wasn't a signer. It was all In Mr. Abbott's name.
17
I felt that conspicuously absent from the
18
documents I received was something from Mr. Kasir in
19
the agreement that he entered into with Keystone with
20
regard to his interest.
21
I didn't have that. I would have like to
22
have maybe seen that to see if, in fact, Mr. Abbott
23
had signed off on that agreement and where that is, I
don't know. But I thought maybe that could have been 24
important here.
25
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I think that was the case today. All witnesses were relating their remembrance of the facts in a way that
was truthful.
Money, money, money is what we're dealing
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Mr. Hartley, shall we refer the matter to
AP&P; is that the State's request as well?
MS. RAGAN: It \sf Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Robbennolt,
you'll need to report to Adult Probation and Parole no
later than 4:00 o'clock tomorrow, provide them
information they need to complete a presentence
report.
Sentencing in this matter will be set for
- it looks like April the 11th at 9:30 in the
morning.
Where it is a bench trial, Ms. Ragan, I'm
not sure that you need to prepare findings in order.
We can just use our minute entry, but that will be
your choice.
_
MS. RAGAN: I did take some notes,
Your Honor, so...
THE COURT: Again, I appreciate Counsel
and their efforts today. I would like to keep these
exhibits at least until such time as sentencing.
Did you want these back, Mr. Hartley?
These weren't actually —
MR. HARTLEY: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And is that date going to be
good for you on the 11th?
224
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1
MR. HARTLEY: Yes, it is, Your Honor.
2
THE COURT: Okay. All right. That will j
3 take care of it. We'll be in recess. Thank you.
4
(Trial Adjourned at 3:49 p.m.)
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